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Abstract
We consider a class of zero-sum stochastic positional games that generalizes the
deterministic antagonistic positional games with average payoﬀs. We prove the
existence of saddle points for the considered class of games and propose an approach
for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players.
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1 Introduction and Problem Formulation
The aim of this paper is to prove the existence of saddle points for a class of an-
tagonistic stochastic games that extends deterministic positional games with
average payoﬀs from [1,2,5]. The considered class of games we formulate by us-
ing the framework of a Markov decision process (X,A, c, p, x0) with a ﬁnite set
of states X, a ﬁnite set of actions A = ∪x∈XA(x) where A(x) is the set of ac-
tions in the state x ∈ X, a probability transition function p : X×A×X → [0, 1]
that satisﬁes the condition
∑
y∈X p
a
x,y = 1, ∀x ∈ X, a ∈ A(x), and the cost
function c : X ×X → R. We assume that the Markov process describes the
evolution of a dynamic system that is controlled by two players as follows:
The set of states is divided into two subsets X = X1 ∪X2 with X1 ∩X2 = ∅,
where X1 represents the position set of the ﬁrst player and X2 represents the
position set of the second player. At time moment t = 0 the dynamical sys-
tem is in the state x0. If this state belongs to the set of positions of the ﬁrst
player then the action a0 ∈ A(x0) in this state is selected by the ﬁrst player,
otherwise the action a0 ∈ A(x0) is chosen by the second player. After that the
dynamical system passes randomly to an another state according to the proba-
bility distribution {pa0x0,y}. At time moment t = 1 the players observe the state
x1 ∈ X of the system. If x1 belongs to the set of positions of the ﬁrst player
then the action a ∈ A(x1) is chosen by the ﬁrst player, otherwise the action
is chosen by the second one and so on, indeﬁnitely. In this process the ﬁrst
player intends to maximize lim
t→∞
inf 1
t
t∑
τ=1
μ(xτ−1), where μ(xτ ) =
∑
y∈X
paτxτ ,ycxτ ,y,
and the second player intends to minimize lim
t→∞
sup 1
t
t∑
τ=1
μ(xτ−1). We assume
that the players use stationary strategies of a selection of the actions in their
position sets. We deﬁne the stationary strategies of the players as maps:
s1 : x → a ∈ A(x) for x ∈ X1; s2 : x → a ∈ A(x) for x ∈ X2. Let s1, s2 be
arbitrary strategies of the players.Then s = (s1, s2) determines a Markov pro-
cess induced by probability distributions {psi(x)x,y } in the states x ∈ Xi, i = 1, 2
and a given starting state x0. For this Markov process with transition costs
cx,y, x, y ∈ X we can determine the average cost per transition Fxo(s1, s2).
The function Fxo(s
1, s2) on S = S1×S2, where S1 and S2 represent the corre-
sponding sets of the stationary strategies of player 1 and player 2, deﬁnes an
antagonistic game. This game is determined by position sets X1, X2, the set of
actions A, the probability function p, the cost function c and the starting state
x0. We denote this game by (X1, X2, A, c, p, x0) and call it zero-sum average
stochastic positional game. In this game, we are seeking for the saddle points.
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2 The Main Results
We show that for the considered zero-sum game there exists a saddle point,
i.e there exist s1
∗
, s2
∗
for which
Fx(s
1∗, s2
∗
) = max
s1∈S1
min
s2∈S2
Fx(s
1, s2) = min
s2∈S2
max
s1∈S1
Fx(s
1, s2).
Theorem 2.1 Let (X1, X2, A, c, p, x) be an antagonistic stochastic po-
sitional game with average payoﬀ Fx(s
1, s2). Then the system of equations
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
εx + ωx = max
a∈A(x)
{
μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy
}
, ∀x ∈ X1;
εx + ωx = min
a∈A(x)
{
μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy
}
, ∀x ∈ X2;
(1)
has a solution under the set of solutions of the system of equations⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ωx = max
a∈A(x)
{ ∑
y∈X
pax,yωy
}
, ∀x ∈ X1;
ωx = min
a∈A(x)
{ ∑
y∈X
pax,yωy
}
, ∀x ∈ X2,
(2)
i.e. the system of equations (2) has such a solution ω∗x, x ∈ X for which
there exists a solution ε∗x, x ∈ X of the system of equations
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
εx + ω
∗
x = max
a∈A(x)
{
μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy
}
, ∀x ∈ X1;
εx + ω
∗
x = min
a∈A(x)
{
μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy
}
, ∀x ∈ X2.
The optimal stationary strategies s1
∗
, s2
∗
of the players can be found by ﬁxing
arbitrary maps s1
∗
(x) ∈ A(x) for x ∈ X1 and s2∗(x) ∈ A(x) for x ∈ X2 such
that
s1
∗
(x)∈
(
Arg max
a∈A(x)
{ ∑
y∈X
pax,yω
∗
y
})⋂(
Arg max
a∈A(x)
{
μx,a+
∑
y∈X
pax,yε
∗
y
})
, x ∈X1,
s2
∗
(x)∈
(
Arg max
a∈A(x)
{ ∑
y∈X
pax,yω
∗
y
})⋂(
Arg max
a∈A(x)
{
μx,a+
∑
y∈X
pax,yε
∗
y
})
, x ∈X2.
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Proof (Sketch) Let x ∈ X be an arbitrary state and consider the stationary
strategies s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2 for which Fx(s1, s2) = mins2∈S2 maxs1∈S1 Fx(s1, s2).
We show that Fx(s
1, s2) = maxs1∈S1 mins2∈S2 Fx(s1, s2), i.e. we show that
s1 = s1
∗
, s2 = s2
∗
.
If we consider the Markov decision process induced by strategies s1, s2 then
according to the properties of the bias equations for this decision process the
system of linear equations⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
εx + ωx = μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy, ∀x ∈ X1, a = s1(x);
εx + ωx = μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy, ∀x ∈ X2, a = s2(x);
ωx =
∑
y∈X
pax,yωy, ∀x ∈ X1, a = s1(x);
ωx =
∑
y∈X
pax,yωy, ∀x ∈ X2, a = s2(x)
(3)
has the solution ε∗x, ω
∗
x (x ∈ X) which for a ﬁxed strategy s2 ∈ S2 satisﬁes the
condition:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ε∗x + ω
∗
x ≥ μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yε
∗
y, ∀x ∈ X1, a ∈ A(x);
ε∗x + ω
∗
x = μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yε
∗
y, ∀x ∈ X2, a = s2(x);
ω∗x ≥
∑
y∈X
pax,yω
∗
y , ∀x ∈ X1, a ∈ A(x);
ω∗x =
∑
y∈X
pax,yω
∗
y , ∀x ∈ X2, a = s2(x)
and Fx(s
1, s2) = ω∗x, ∀x ∈ X.
Taking into account that Fx(s
1, s2) = mins2∈S2 Fx(s1, s2) then for a ﬁxed
strategy s1 ∈ S1 the solution ∗x, ω∗x (x ∈ X) satisﬁes the condition
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ε∗x + ω
∗
x = μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yε
∗
y, ∀x ∈ X1, a = s1(x);
ε∗x + ω
∗
x ≤ μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yε
∗
y, ∀x ∈ X2, a ∈ A(x);
ω∗x =
∑
y∈X
pax,yω
∗
y , ∀x ∈ X1, a = s1(x);
ω∗x ≤
∑
y∈X
pax,yω
∗
y , ∀x ∈ X2, a ∈ A(x)
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So, the following system
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
εx + ωx ≥ μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy, ∀x ∈ X1, a ∈ A(x);
εx + ωx ≤ μx,a +
∑
y∈X
pax,yεy, ∀x ∈ X2, a ∈ A(x);
ωx ≥
∑
y∈X
pax,yωy, ∀x ∈ X1, a ∈ A(x);
ωx ≤
∑
y∈X
pax,yωy, ∀x ∈ X2, a ∈ A(x)
has a solution, which satisﬁes condition (3). This means that s1 = s1
∗
,
s2 = s2
∗
and
Fx(s
1∗, s2) = max
s1∈S1
min
s2∈S2
Fx(s
1, s2) = min
s2∈S2
max
s1∈S1
Fx(s
1, s2), ∀x ∈ X,
i.e. , the theorem holds. 
The obtained saddle point condition for zero-sum stochastic games gen-
eralizes the saddle point condition for deterministic average positional games
from [1,5]. Based on Theorem 2.1 we may conclude that the optimal strategies
of the players in the considered game can be found if we determine a solution
of equations (1),(2). We have shown that a solution of these equations can
be determined using iterative algorithms like algorithms for determining the
optimal solutions of an average Markov decision problem [3,4].
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